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Chipley: Environmental Law--Standing to Sue

COMMENTS
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW--STANDING TO SUE
Ln recent years the protection of the environment from
destruction or abuse has become an impelling cause for groups
of concerned citizens. However, in many cases these people
have been denied adjudication of their attempts to save the
environment by what might seem to be archaic procedural
rules.' In most cases, those without a direct property interest
have been denied access to a judicial determination of the
merits of their complaint. Even in recent years, liberalization
of the requirements of standing has occurred slowly and in
scattered areas of the law. The scope of this comment will be
to present the present situation as it has developed, and to
examine the virtues and drawbacks of the status quo as compared to possible alternatives.
The question of standing in environmental cases has
generally arisen in two different areas of law: administrative
law and public nuisance law. Standing to appeal an administrative decision is a relatively recent problem, since the whole
field of administrative law is in a formative stage. But in the
field of public nuisance law, the law regarding standing has
been well established.2
Disregarding some recent decisions, the common law dictated that a private individual could not bring an action for
the abatement of a public nuisance,' unless it was also a private nuisance, or unless a different and greater injury was
suffered by the complaining party than by the general public.
The same rule has been applied to groups of concerned citizens with only limited exceptions.4 It can be safely said that,
subject to few exceptions, the state has been the only entity
permitted to sue for abatement of an exclusively public
nuisance.
Copyright @ 1971 by the University of Wyoming

1. See notes 5, 7 and 8, infra.
2. Although the law is settled in nuisance cases-that an individual cannot
gain court recognition in an attempt to abate a public nuisance-there are
signs of change. For instance in the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Tentative
Draft 16, § 821c, there are signs of rebellion against the "harm of a different kind" rule. See also, 38 U.S. Law Week 2632 (1970).
3. 39 AM. JURL Nuisance § 124 (1942).
4. Shreveport Anti-Vice Committee v. Simon, 151 La. 494, 91 So. 851 (1922).
Most of the exceptions to the general rule are cases involving citizens'
attempts to terminate the operation of brothels.
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In one recent case, Sarasota County Anglers Club v.
Burns,' a sportsmen's group was held to have no standing to
enjoin the state approved dredging of certain bottomlands by
a landowner. Since there was no statutory basis for standing,
and apparently no special injury, the court said, "We must
agree... that the plaintiffs have failed to show in what manner
they have been damaged as private citizens differing in kind
from the general public and therefore have no right to sue." 8
The court then concluded that only the state could sue for
such an injunction.
Suits for environmental protection by homeowners' organizations have presented problems similar to those presented by conservation-group suits. The courts have previously given a similar answer to a similar problem: no standing. In one recent case, an attempt by such a homeowners'
group to enjoin the pollution of a lake upon which many of the
members lived failed when the court denied standing. "No
one can constitute himself a guardian of the public and maintain an action for public nuisance which does not sensibly
injure him or his property."' This court, like many others,
was reluctant to grant standing to an association which did
not own property, even though most of its members did. The
court also reasoned that to allow suits by private individuals
would be to deprive the state of its rightful hand in determination of public policy.
The prohibition against individual or group suits has
often been carried to illogical extremes. In one such case,'
two District Attorneys joined with the members of a local conservation association in an attempt to enjoin, as a public
nuisance, the pollution of a river. As a practical matter, most
of the work was carried on by the Allegheny County Sportsmen's League, and, in fact, the League's attorneys were appointed as deputies by the District Attorneys. When the
case came to trial the court refused to rule on the merits,
5. Sarasota County Anglers Club v. Burns, 193 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1967), aff'd.,
200 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1967).
6. Sarasota County Anglers Club v. Burns, 193 So. 2d 691, 693 (Fla. 1967).
7. Garland Grain Co. v. D-C Home Owners Investment Assoc., 393 S.W. 2d
635, 640 (Tex. 1965).
8. Commonwealth ex rel. Shumaker v. New York & Pennsylvania Co., 378 Pa.
359, 106 A. 2d 239 (1954).
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claiming that the District Attorneys had unlawfully abdicated
their vested authority. The lone dissenting judge asked the
majority what the harm would be in having experts prepare
and prosecute a case for the state. In conclusion he indignantly proclaimed, "The law is a sphinx and in the meanwhile 20
millions of polluted water daily are pouring into the arteries
of the Commonwealth.' 9
In the past the courts have been very strict in their allowance of standing to private individuals in cases involving public nuisances. But in the developing field of administrative
law, the courts have seemed to be more liberal in granting
standing. Still, the general rule is that to appeal an administrative decision, "the plaintiff must show that he is injured,
that is, subjected to or threatened with a legal wrong."
There is very little time-honored precedent involving the
question of standing with reference to conservation groups.
Case law seems to be divided on the question involving any
type of public interest group. While the trend seems to be
the expansion of the class of aggrieved parties, earlier courts
were split; some courts granted standing to groups without
a direct economic interest,1 while some denied it. 2
One of the earliest cases dealing with environmental protection in an administrative context involved the construction
of hydro-electric facilities on the Namekagon River in Wisconsin.
The court found that the facilities would damage
the interests of the public in recreation and aesthetic appreciation. The plant could not be justified upon balancing of the
interests." The court granted standing to the plaintiff, as a
private citizen, saying:
9. Id. at 247.
10. AM. JuR. 2d Administrative Law § 575 (1962).
11. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
This was a successful attempt by the Refugee Committee to have its name
removed from a list of subversive groups.
12. Moffat Tunnel League v. U.S., 289 U.S. 113 (1933); Shaker Community,
Inc. v. State Racing Commission, 346 Mass. 213, 190 N.E. 2d 897 (1963).
The Shaker case was an attempt to appeal the granting of a race track
license near the Shaker Community. The Tunnel case involved an unsuccessful attempt to appeal an ICC ruling allowing one railroad to purchase the
stock of another.
13. Muench v. Public Service Commission, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W. 2d 514 (1952).
14. The actual factual decisions were made upon remand. The case was finally
disposed of 2 years later: Namekagon Hydro. Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 216 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1954).
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Our holding in this respect is in keeping with the
trend manifested in the development of the law of
navigable waters in this state to extend the rights
of the general public to the recreational use of the
waters of this state, and to protect the public in the
enjoyment of such rights."
However, the trend referred to did not gain much impetus
until recent years.
The first important case in the recent conservation trend
was Scenic Hudson PreservationConference v. FPC.8 The
issue involved was whether the Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conference, a group of concerned local citizens, had standing
to sue for an injunction against the granting of a license for
the operation of power producing machinery on the Hudson
River. The license was issued by the FPC as required by the
Federal Power Act. The plaintiffs correctly contended that
the Federal Power Act was effected to promote the most efficient use of water resources, including recreational use,"
and that their interests would be destroyed by the construction
of the plant. The court rejected the answer by the defendants
that plaintiffs lacked standing. The wording of the Federal
Power Act, 8 the court felt, expanded the class of those aggrieved to include those without a direct economic interest.
The Scenic Hudson case was very important in that a voluntary group of citizens were allowed to appeal an administrative decision unfavorable to the environment.
Soon after the Scenic Hudson case, a similar decision was
made in Road Review League, Town of Bedford v. Boyd."
In this decision, a local conservation group was granted standing to appeal an administrative decision by the Federal Highway Administrator, which called for Interstate Highway 87
to run through the Chestnut Ridge section of southern New
York. The plaintiffs claimed this was an arbitrary and shortsighted decision, since Chestnut Ridge was rich aesthetically
15. Muench v. Public Service Commission, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514, 523
(1952).
16. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.
1965).
17. 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1964).
18. 16 U.S.C. § 825 1(b) (1964): "Any person . . . aggrieved."
19. Road Review League, Town of Bedford v. Boyd, 270 F.Supp. 650 (S.D.
N.Y. 1967).
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as well as recreationally. The government alleged the cost
factor made the decision necessary, and, more important, the
plaintiff was not the proper party to appeal such a ruling.
The District Court applied the Scenic Hudson ruling to the
facts, and found that the Administrator had disregarded the
essence of the Federal-Aid Highway Act, by failing to consider both local and environmental needs. 20 Applying the decision in Scenic Hudson that standing should be granted
through the Federal Power Act, the Road Review court found
that the identical language of the Administrative Procedure
Act" could be used as a basis for standing.
Expanding on the allowance of standing to local ad hoc
groups by Scenic Hudson and Road Review, the court deciding Citizens Comittee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe granted
standing to the Sierra Club, a national conservation group,
along with a local citizens' committee and the Village of Tarrytown.22 These groups brought an action in court to enjoin the
partial filling of the Hudson River to support an expressway.
A permit to fill was illegally issued by the Army Corps of
Engineers. Due to a technicality in wording, approval of Congress and the Secretary of Transportation was necessary, in
addition to that already granted. " The court felt the haphazard approach taken by the government would "frustrate
one of the main purposes of the Department of Transportation Act, i.e., the conservation of the country's natural resources.""4 The court then interpreted the Administrative
Procedure Act 5 as follows:
[I] f the statutes involved in the controversy are concerned with the protection of natural, historic and
scenic resources, then a Congressional intent exists
to give standing to groups interested in these factors,
20. 23 U.S.C. § 138 (Supp. III) (1968).
U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. III) (1968). This section entitles any person who is
21. 5"aggrieved
by agency action within the meaning of the relevant statute"
to judicial relief.
22. Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 302 F.Supp. 1083 (S.D.
N.Y. 1969), aff'd., 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970).
23. Congressional approval was necessary for the construction of a "dike" on
a navigable river, through 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1964), while the approval of
the Secretary of Transportation was necessary to construct a causeway, 49
U.S.C, § 1655(g) (Supp. III) (1968).
24. Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 302 F.Supp. 1083, 1092
(S.D. N.Y. 1969).
25. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. III) (1968).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1970

5

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 6 [1970], Iss. 2, Art. 4

532

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. VI

and who allege that these factors are not being properly considered by the agency.2 6
The Court of Appeals affirmed, and acknowledged the legally
protected interest of the Sierra Club, and its right to appeal an
agency decision "in contravention of that public interest."2 7
The Court of Appeals added that "allowance of standing to
private attorneys general in 'public actions' challenging administrative activity is by no means a new or unusual
concept. "
These three cases, Scenic Hudson, Road Review and Citizens Committee, exemplify the trend in administrative law.
Subsequent to these cases, there have been more cases granting
standing to conservation groups. These decisions were
reached by applying the standards set forth in the earlier
vases, or by setting out new more liberal rules. Standing was
granted to four national groups, the Izaak Walton League,
the Sierra Club, the National Audabon Society and the Environmental Defense Fund, along with one local organization,
to appeal the Secretary of Agriculture's inaction in restricting DDT. The only requirement for standing was that the
plaintiffs should "have the necessary stake in the outcome of a
challenge to the Secretary's inaction to contest the issues with
the adverseness required by Article III of the Constitution." 2 '
The same requirements were set out in another recent case in
which the Izaak Walton League was permitted to enjoin
mineral exploration, permitted by the Secretary of Agriculture, in a northern Minnesota Wilderness Area.3" Local
conservation groups have also been granted standing to appeal
administrative decisions in more recent cases. 8 '
26. Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 302 F.Supp. 1083, 1092
(S.D. N.Y. 1969).
27. Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 105 (2d
Cir. 1970).
28. Id. at 102.
29. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1097 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
30. Izaak Walton League v. St. Clair, 313 F.Supp. 1312 (D. Minn. 1970).
31. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 309 F.Supp. 1189 (W.D.
Tenn. 1970) this case was recently affirmed in the Supreme Court-91 S.Ct.
814 (1971); Parker v. U.S., 309 F.Supp. 593 (D. Colo. 1970). The Overton
case involved the efforts of a local ad hoc group to protect a park from
highway construction. The Colorado case was the appeal of an administrative decision to allow timber cutting near Vail, because of the resultant
damage to the natural beauty of the area.
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There are also some indications that the law of nuisance is
becoming more responsive to the fight against pollution. The
judge in one recent case declared:
The fight against pollution of natural resources has
in recent times become a cause celebre. Along with
the increasing recognition of the importance of the
effort, there has developed a feeling of futility when
confronted with the overwhelming array of vested
interests which are often adventitious polluters. 2
The court then went on to declare what was obviously a public
nuisance an actionable private nuisance. Though no court has
openly rejected the old laws of nuisance, distinguishing cases
as was done above might prove a valuable tool.
Problems of standing in these environmental cases might
become things of the past. Standing granted by statute to
those affected by environmental destruction is in effect in
one state-Michigan, and has been presented to Congress for
its approval as a national policy. The Michigan statute (and
the nearly identical federal proposal) reads:
The attorney general, any political subdivision of
the state, any instrumentality or agency of the state
or of any political subdivision thereof, any person,
partnership, corporation, association, organization or
other legal entity may maintain an action.., for declaratory and equitable relief against ... any... legal
entity for the protection of the air, water and other
natural resources and the public trust therein from
pollution, impairment or destruction.3
This statute went into effect on October 1, 1970, and has not
yet been proven effective, or immune from loopholes. However, it does seem to provide a valuable weapon for conservationists.
The fact that standing, as a matter of right, is becoming
a reality would seem to be an appealing thought. But there
still remains the question of whether or not a judicial determination of such questions is the best method. It seems as
32. White Lake Improvement Assoc. v. City of Whitehall, 177 N.W.2d 473, 474
(Ct. App. Mich. 1970).
33. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(202) (1970).
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though the advantages of such a system far outnumber the
disadvantages.
The disadvantages of a judicial determination of such
questions can be briefly summarized. First, few judges are
experts on any field and there would be even fewer with special
knowledge on the field of conservation. "Certainly judges are
no wiser in such matters than those who hold administrative
posts." 4 Second, courts are not endowed with investigative
funds; they must rely on the presentation of the parties to
get an accurate view of the facts. Administrative agencies
often perform investigations to discover facts. Finally,
crowded court dockets often make judicial relief a timeconsuming process.
iowever, these disadvantages are balanced by several
important advantages. First, the courts do not entertain
personal or political ties with the parties involved, as is often
the case with an administrative agency. "Judges do not ordinarily receive telephone calls from Senators . . ., and they do
not have an agency's program or budget to balance against
the merits of a particular case."" Related to this idea is the
fact that judges, who spend very little of their time on environmental problems, develop no set attitude towards the
problem. "It may seem a paradox that the greatest strength
of an institution is its lack of expertise."3 6 Administrative
agencies quickly become burdened by familiarity. "Any official who deals routinely with particular interest groups inevitably feels the need to do some 'trading' in order to maintain a credible position in the eyes of those constituencies."7
Secondly, administrators are much more prone to give the
benefit of the doubt to those with economic interests involved.
Courts are less likely to take this position:
[T]he bureaucratic perspective tends to intensify the
problem of the so-called "nibbling phenomenon", the
process on which large resource values are gradually
eroded, case by case, as one development after another
is allowed. The danger is that in each title dispute34. J. Sax,

DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT,

108 (1971).

35. Id. at 108.
36. Id. at 110.
37. Id. at 110.
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when the pressure is on-the balance of judgment will
move ever so slightly to resolve doubts in favor of
those with a big economic stake in development and
with powerful allies. 8
This problem is one of the most important factors in preferring judicial rather than administrative determination.
Finally, the availability of the court is a tremendous
advantage over administrative hearings. The court is an open
forum. "The opportunity for anyone to obtain at least a hearing and honest consideration of matters that he feels important
must not be underestimated. "" A citizen with a legitimate
grievance can rightfully feel that he has an opportunity to
have it adjudicated. "Litigation is thus a means of access for
the ordinary citizen to the process of governmental decision
making. "40
Protection of the environment is quickly becoming one of
the greatest national priorities. In the past the ordinary citizen has been denied his opportunity to express his views in
the courtroom or administrative hearings. Liberalization of
the rules of standing, in nuisance actions, and in appeals of
administrative actions, is providing every man a chance to be
heard. Hopefully, the sphinx is losing its enigmatic quality.4
LUCIEN CHIPLEY

38. Id. at 55.
39. Id. at 112.
40. Id. at 57.
41.

See note 9.
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